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BAPTISTS?:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL INTEREST GROUPS
Todd J. Zywickit
ABSTRACT
It has been argued that environmental regulation can be best un-
derstood as the product of an unlikely alliance of "Baptists and Boot-
leggers" - public-interested environmental activist groups and pri-
vate-interested firms and industries seeking to use regulation for
competitive advantage. It is now well-understood how special-
interests can manipulate regulation for competitive advantage. More-
over, economics has provided models of the results of private self-
interest in markets and in politics. But, until now, economists have
not provided a workable model of private self-interest by environ-
mental non-profit organizations, nor have there been efforts to test a
private interest model versus the predictions of public interest models
of environmental activists. Some have gone so far as to suggest that
environmental activists are motivated by a spirit of "civic republican-
ism" that causes them to subordinate their self-interest to the pursuit
of the public good.
This Article provides a first effort at testing the implications of
public interest versus private interest models of environmental inter-
est groups. In particular, it specifies three testable implications of a
public interest model of the activities of environmental interest
groups: (1) a desire to base policy on the best-available science; (2) a
willingness to engage in deliberation and compromise to balance en-
vironmental protection against other compelling social and economic
interests; and, (3) a willingness to consider alternative regulatory
strategies that can deliver environmental protection at lower-cost than
traditional command-and-control regulation. On all three counts, it is
found that the public-interest or "civic republican" explanation for the
activities of environmental interest groups fails to convincingly de-
scribe their behavior. On the other hand, the evidence on each of
t Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
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these three tests is consistent with a self-interested model of the be-
havior of environmental interest-groups. Their activities can be un-
derstood as being identical to those of any other interest group -
namely, the desire to use the coercive power of government to subsi-
dize their personal desires for greater environmental protection and to
redistribute wealth and power to themselves.
INTRODUCTION
In a famous article some years ago, Bruce Yandle postulated
that the politics of environmental regulation (and many other
regulations) could best be understood through the model of
"Baptists and Bootleggers" - the product of an unlikely
coincidence of interest between environmentalists and self-
interested economic interests.' Yandle illustrates the idea with the
parable of "Sunday Blue Laws" in southern states that prohibited
the sale of alcohol on Sundays. Southern Baptists favored the
prohibition on religious and moral grounds. At the same time,
sellers of illegal moonshine whiskey - "Bootleggers" - favored the
prohibition as well, because it gave them a monopoly on the
market for one full day a week. As a result, both of these parties
favored the political perpetuation of the ban, albeit for very
different reasons. Thus, somewhat anomalously, these ardent
philosophical opponents can be political allies in practice.
Yandle argues that environmental regulation functions similarly,
with environmental interest groups playing the role of the "Baptists"
and industry (or some firms within a given industry) playing the role
of "Bootleggers., 2 It is now well-understood how industry Bootleg-
gers can use regulation strategically to gain an advantage over their
rivals, such as by raising rivals' relative cost, expanding their own
market through subsidies and regulation, or by using regulation to
impose barriers to entry by competitors.3 What is less understood is
the nature of the organizations that represent themselves to be the
Baptists, those who purportedly lobby and influence policy-makers
1 Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists - The Education of a Regulatory Economist,
REGULATION, May-June 1983, at 12, 13-14.
2 BRUCE YANDLE, THE POLITICAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 19-39
(1989); see also BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
68-79 (1997) (describing Baptists and Bootleggers model and contrasting with other models of
regulation, including public interest model).
3 An extensive discussion of these models, with empirical evidence and case studies in
support, is presented in Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political External-
ities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845,
856-74 (1999) [hereinafter Environmental Externalities]; see also James M. Buchanan and
Gordon Tullock, Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65
AM. ECON. REV. 139, 141-42 (1975) (stating that firms have an incentive to seek economic
regulation due to its cartel-like effect of allowing for above-average returns in the short term).
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from supposed "civic republican values" or "the public interest"
rather than narrow self-interest.
The failure to examine the political economy of environmental
interest groups is striking, especially as the influence of environ-
mental activists has grown both domestically and globally. They
have proven especially influential as the proliferation of international
bureaucracies, unelected and unaccountable to any voters, have in-
creasingly assumed control over the implementation of environmental
policies.4 With respect to the activities of firms and individuals oper-
ating in the private market, the study of self-interest behavior in the
private markets has comprised the core of economics at least since
Adam Smith. Similarly, the public choice revolution has successfully
applied the assumptions and tools of economics to explain much of
the process and output of governmental activity. Little has been done,
however, to apply economics to the study of the institutions that com-
prise civil society, "Non-Governmental Organizations" (more popu-
larly, NGO's) that are neither private profit-maximizing entities nor
public vote-maximizing entities. In general, it implicitly has been
assumed that environmental interest groups are exceptions to the self-
interest models that economists have applied to market and political
behavior, apparent islands of selflessness in a sea of selfishness. This
essay will undertake the task of laying out an economic model of en-
vironmental interest-groups with the goal of developing a positive
economic and political model of environmental interests groups, and
comparing the predictions of this model with a "public interest"
model of government. In keeping with the theme of this symposium,
the goal of the article will be to explain a peculiarity that resides at
the core of Bjorn Lomborg's book, The Skeptical Environmentalist -
namely, the striking tendency of environmental groups to dramati-
cally and consistently misrepresent scientific and economic evidence
so as to mislead and "scare" the public.5 As the analysis will suggest,
the "Baptist" moniker ascribed to environmental interest groups is of
questionable validity. Instead, it will be shown that the behavior of
environmental activist groups is better explained by a model of pri-
vate advantage, rather than a "public interest" motivation. In particu-
lar, it will be argued that much of the activity of environmental inter-
est groups, although not necessarily all, results from the pursuit of
wealth, power, and the personal gratification of environmental activist
groups and their leaders.
4 See JEREMY RABKIN & JAMES SHEEHAN, GLOBAL GREENS, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
(1999) (discussing the emerging influence of international bureaucracies on environmental
policy).
5 BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE
OF THE WORLD (Cambridge University Press 2001) (1998).
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In short, like any other rent-seeking interest group, the behavior
of environmental interest groups can be best explained by the desire
to use the coercive power of government to allow some individuals to
pursue utility and wealth and to force other individuals to subsidize
these preferences, a process that I have elsewhere dubbed a political
externality. 6 Like more commonly-recognized definitions of "exter-
nality," a political externality describes the situation where one indi-
vidual gains the benefit of a given activity but is not forced to bear the
full cost of the activity. Instead, some of the cost is borne by others
who do not receive the corresponding benefit. Where transaction
costs are positive, the failure of the beneficiary to consider the costs
of his activity will lead to inefficient results for the economy and in-
equitable results for those harmed by the activity. For instance, if my
neighbor raises and slaughters hogs in his backyard, he gains the full
economic benefit of the activity. I, on the other hand, am forced to
bear the stench, sound, and unsanitariness of the operation along with
him, even though I receive none of the benefit. Thus, even though
my neighbor will be distressed by these same costs, he will only con-
sider his private costs, not the costs to me. In short, his ability to
"use" my land and air to dump his stench and run-off functionally
operates as an involuntary subsidy from me to him. The only sure
way to alleviate the efficiency and equity problems is for my neighbor
to compensate me for the harm he has caused me, preferably through
consensual transfer of rights. If he is unable to offer an amount ade-
quate to compensate me for my loss and to still make a profit, or to
acquire my land and thereby to eliminate the externality, then the
economically efficient result is for him to cease his hog-farming op-
erations or to move them elsewhere, out of a residential neighbor-
hood.7 If my neighbor can continue to operate his farm without my
consent, or without providing compensation or transaction costs pre-
vent a voluntary transaction then he has succeeded in imposing an
external cost on me, and there is no guarantee that the total economic
benefits of his activity are greater than the total economic costs, in-
cluding the harm I suffer.
While this scenario is now well-understood by environmental
scholars, it generally is not recognized that political decision-making
operates similarly. Where transaction costs are zero and unanimous
consent is required for any collective decision, then the results of col-
lective decision-making will follow those of the Coase Theorem as it
6 Environmental Externalities, supra note 3, at 850-52.
7 See Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common
Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number
Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 966-81 (1996) [hereinafter Unanimity-
Reinforcing] (describing the importance of consensual transactions in light of subjective nature
of costs and preferences).
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operates in private exchange. 8 But as soon as transaction costs be-
come positive or unanimous consent is no longer required for collec-
tive action, then allocative inefficiencies and inequity can occur. At
that point, members of the winning coalition can compel political los-
ers to contribute to the cost of providing the policy preferred by the
winners. As Buchanan and Tullock wrote in The Calculus of Con-
sent:
[T]he discussion about externality in the literature of welfare
economics has been centered on the external costs expected
to result from private action of individuals or firms. To our
knowledge little or nothing has been said about the external
costs imposed on the individual by collective action. Yet the
existence of such external costs is inherent in the operation of
any collective decision-making rule other than that of una-
nimity. Indeed, the essence of the collective-choice process
under majority voting rules is the fact that the minority of
voters are forced to accede to actions which they cannot pre-
vent and for which they cannot claim compensation for dam-
ages resulting. Note that this is precisely the definition pre-
viously given for externality.9
The point to recognize, therefore, is that externalities are present
in every situation where there is the opportunity for certain individu-
als to acquire certain benefits and to force others to bear some or all
of the costs. This is true of both market activity as well as collective
decision-making through politics. The problem is generally alleviated
in market activity through the specification of property rights and the
opportunity to make consensual transfers of property. By contrast,
the presence of these externalities is the very definition of political
decision-making. The ability of some individuals to gain benefits and
to force other groups to pay for it is inherent in political decision-
making. When the locus of decision-making authority rests with con-
sensual decision-making through private market exchanges or volun-
tary governance,' 0 the threat of externalities can be minimized
through institutions designed to reduce transaction costs and maxi-
mize consent. By contrast, once the locus of decision-making author-
ity moves from these consent-based institutions to political decision-
making these rent-seeking costs cannot be avoided - they are an in-
8 See James M. Buchanan, The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State, 13 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 579, 583-84 (1973) (asserting that since representative government is the instru-
ment of its citizens, the Coase theorem is equally applicable to state and private action).
9 JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 89-90 (1962) (fourth emphasis added).
10 Such as described by Elinor Ostrom. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COM-
MONS 15-18 (1990).
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herent part of collective decision-making by non-unanimous voting
rules. Moreover, under a regime of majority voting, these costs sim-
ply cannot be reduced below a certain level because the consent of the
losers is simply irrelevant to the process. In the economy, uncompen-
sated externalities is seen as a form of market failure. By contrast,
uncompensated political externalities is the definition of political de-
cision-making. This is what makes rent-seeking possible - the ability
of some groups to use the power of government to transfer benefits to
themselves without being forced to pay compensation to the losers.
12
Given that the primary activity of environmental activist groups
is to influence policy through legislation, regulation, and litigation, it
may thus be fruitful to consider the implications of examining the
activities of environmental interest groups as economic entities. As
the analysis will demonstrate, on close examination it is not clear that
the operation of these organizations and their members is really so
different from other private actors seeking to influence government
policy. In particular, these groups and their leaders seek to use politi-
cal power to transfer benefits to themselves without being forced to
pay the full costs they impose.
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows. Part I will
review Lomborg's discussion of the manner in which environmental
interest groups distort the findings of science in order to make envi-
ronmental conditions appear worse than they actually are. Part II will
then discuss whether Lomborg's findings can be explained through
public interest motives, i.e., that the behavior of environmental inter-
est groups is can be best explained by a desire to maximize human
welfare subject to scarcity. Part III provides a private interest model
of environmental interest groups as rent-seeking organizations seek-
ing to provide private benefits to themselves and their members at the
expense of the dispersed public. The final part provides concluding
thoughts.
I. SCIENCE OR SCARE TACTICS?
Dating back to the dawn of the environmental movement, much
of the strength of the environmentalist movement has resulted from
their claim that their arguments are grounded in science. Lomborg
identifies himself as "an old left-wing Greenpeace member" and long-
time environmentalist who undertook the research project that be-
' See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 63-
64 (2000).
12 Of course, they will likely have to pay politicians through campaign contributions and
the like to influence them to provide the transfers, so some of the value of the transfer will be
lost through these transaction costs. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Mo-
nopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (highlighting the likelihood of sizable invest-
ments in political activity to influence legislation in one's economic interest).
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came The Skeptical Environmentalist expecting to rebut the optimism
of the late economist Julian Simon. 13 Simon believed, contrary to the
conventional wisdom, that the world was getting better and better
over time, as reflected in improvements in the conditions necessary
for human flourishing. Poverty was falling, material conditions were
improving, and yes, environmental quality was improving around the
world. Lomborg, weaned on "the Litany of our ever deteriorating
environment," believed that Simon must be misguided. 14
Instead, Lomborg discovered that it was the Litany itself, not
Simon, that was wrong. And, in fact, many of the claims of the Lit-
any were appallingly wrong, in many cases defying even common
sense. Lomberg states that the "media play a central role" in promul-
gating "the Litany" by sporadically and incoherently reporting results
of research studies. 15  Lomborg's analysis of high-profile environ-
mental interest groups probably only scratches the surface of the ways
in which the myths of the Litany are promulgated by supposed "au-
thorities" to an unsuspecting public. As the Litany trickles down
from environmental activists, to second-hand popularizers (such as
zoos and schools), and to the public, the Litany becomes increasingly
influential. Given their popularly-oriented constituency, these inter-
mediary groups lack incentives to question the conventional wisdom
of the Litany, and indeed, face many of the same incentives to distort
the truth as the activist groups examined by Lomborg, so as to raise
money and the like. Personal experience suggests that second-hand
consumers of the Litany, such as zoos and schools, that popularize the
Litany and pass it on to the public are at least as guilty as the media in
biting on the claims of environmental activists.'
6
As economist Bryan Caplan has demonstrated, where an indi-
vidual gains utility from holding a particular irrational belief (such as
about religion, the economy, or a sports team) and the personal costs
that result from holding such a belief are negligible, then it can be
predicted that individuals will consume a greater amount of the irra-
tional belief than otherwise.' 7  Thus, to the extent that belief in the
13 LOMBORG, supra note 5, at xix.
14 Id. at 3.
1 Id. at 39. Lomborg adds that researchers and those who finance them also play a part in
spreading the Litany. Id. at 35-38.
'6 For instance, Zoogoer magazine, published by the National Zoo in Washington, DC is
riddled with bad science (and even worse economics).
17 See Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance Versus Rational Irrationality, 54 KYKLOS 3, 4
(2001) (proposing a model of "rational irrationality" that explains how holding beliefs that differ
from rational expectations may be the result of rational weighing of costs versus benefits);
Bryan Caplan, Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political Failure, 107 PUB.
CHOICE 311 (2001) (reexamining four well-known models of political failure by incorporating
irrational expectations into the behavioral assumptions of those four models); Bryan Caplan,
The Logic of Collective Belief, RATIONALITY AND SOC. (forthcoming 2003) (working paper at
3, available at http://www.independent.org/tii/WorkingPapers/LogicOfCollectiveBelief.pdf)
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Litany provides groups and individuals with utility, it would be ex-
pected that many people would tend to believe in the Litany, unless
there are incentives for believing otherwise. For zoos and their pa-
trons, the personal cost of being misinformed about the Litany is es-
sentially zero. One individual's efforts to inform himself for purposes
of correcting public opinion or political policy will be useless because
of the irrelevance of one single vote to the political process. In short,
whether a single individual American believes the Litany regarding
the vanishing rain forests in Brazil will have no effect on global envi-
ronmental policy. Whether one individual is correct or incorrect
about the reality, extent, causes, and solutions to the vanishing rain
forest, whatever that person decides will be, at maximum, equally
influential as the opinions of the world's other 6 billion citizens.
Moreover, this particular individual will gain the psychological bene-
fit of believing in the Litany of vanishing rain forests, whereas Brazil-
ians will bear the entire cost of environmental austerity policies taken
to effectuate the Litany. As Caplan predicts, therefore, where there
are feedback incentives in place for individuals to correct the errors of
conventional wisdom, then it is possible for people to do so. But
where no such incentives are in place, one would expect individuals
to act in accordance with "rational irrationality," believing the irra-
tional belief if it gives him utility.
This utility can take many forms, psychological, social
(conforming to "sophisticated opinion" and peer pressure), or
spiritual. Caplan demonstrates the phenomenon through surveys of
economic opinion. He finds, for instance, that while the public does
not understand the economic effects of the minimum wage or free
trade, economists uniformly understand the effects of these policies.
The difference, Caplan argues, is that economists have an incentive to
reach the correct conclusions about the effect of these policies be-
cause the failure or success of their personal careers depend on cor-
rectly understanding these sorts of facts. Individual members of the
public, by contrast, lack such an incentive, as their opinion matters
only when it comes time to vote. As one voter in one hundred million
possible voters, there is little reason for an individual to inform him-
self of the effects of the minimum wage or free trade, and no penalty
if he is wrong because the effect of bad policies on his personal life
are likely to be infinitesimal. Moreover, it is likely that these popular
groups are much more influential in influencing public opinion than
"professional" environmental organizations such as Greenpeace, both
(last visited Oct. 31, 2002); see also Bryan Caplan, What Makes People Think Like Economists?
Evidence on Economic Cognition from the "Survey of Americans and Economists on the Econ-
omy", 44 J. L. & ECON. 395 (2001) (reporting a study of factors that make an individual more
or less likely to reject the consensus of professional economists).
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because their popular orientation enables them to reach many more
people and also because of the experiential nature of the experience,
which likely heightens the emotional impact of the message. One
suspects for instance, that many people are more receptive to the
myths of "vanishing forests" and species extinctions of the world
when packaged with the experience of cute monkeys, panda bears,
and elephants. Although Lomborg focuses on the media as a pur-
veyor of these myths, it is likely that a similar analysis applies to
these many popular environmentally-oriented groups.
Many of the myths of the Litany emanate from environmental
activist groups, and this Section will briefly summarize Lomborg's
analysis of some of the notable myths that some environmental inter-
est groups have advanced through the years.
A. The Worldwatch Institute
The Worldwatch Institute comes in for especially tough criticism
by Lomborg, in part because of its high profile and in part because of
the boldness of its claims.' 8 Since 1984, the Worldwatch Institute has
published its State of the World report, which purports to be a sum-
mary of global environmental trends and statistics. In 1998, it re-
ported that "[t]he key environmental indicators are increasingly nega-
tive. Forests are shrinking, water tables are falling, soils are eroding,
wetlands are disappearing, fisheries are collapsing, range-lands are
deteriorating, rivers are running dry, temperatures are rising, coral
reefs are dying, and plant and animal species are disappearing."' 9 As
Lomborg notes, almost none of this is correct, and many of the asser-
tions are exactly the opposite of the real facts. Indeed, Worldwatch
even refers to reliable factual reports - then states the opposite of the
facts actually reported there. For instance, Lomborg observes that
Worldwatch reports that "Canada is losing some 200,000 hectares of
forest a year," citing the FAO's State of the World's Forests 1997. 2o
But the FAO reports that in fact Canada did not lose forests, but in-
stead grew 174,600 more hectares of forest each year.2' Worldwatch
is similarly wrong in its reportage of the effects of acid rain, oil
prices, and population growth. As Lomborg concludes, "Blatant er-
rors are ... made with unfortunate frequency. 22 He adds:
18 LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 13-16 (stating that many expressions of the Litany can often
be traced to Worldwatch and criticizing several of the organization's claims as unsupported by
data).
19 Id. at 13 (quoting STATE OF THE WORLD: A WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE REPORT ON
PROGRESS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 4 (1998)).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 13 (quoting FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., STATE OF THE WORLD'S FOR-
ESTS 138 (1997)).
22 Id.
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[I]n its shorthand appraisal of the state of the world since
1984, Worldwatch Institute sets out a list of problems, all of
which have improved since then, and all but one of which
have improved immensely, and one of which is just plain
wrong. . . . The problem, of course, is not lack of data -
Worldwatch Institute publishes fine data collections, which
are also used in this book [i.e., The Skeptical Environmental-
ist] - but merely a carelessness that comes with the ingrained
belief in the Litany. 23
B. World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
WWF exhibits the degree to which environmental activist groups
are not only wrong about the technical scientific evidence, but the
extent to which some of the assertions that comprise the Litany, are
not plausible and do not comport with common sense. Lomborg re-
ports that in 1997, the WWF issued a press release entitled "Two-
thirds of the world's forests lost forever"24 and added in a larger re-
port entitled Global Annual Forest Report that "new research by
WWF shows that almost two-thirds of the world's original forest
cover has been lost. '25 As Lomborg observes, most sources estimate
26atinoalheeino
about 20 percent deforestation. But what is notable here is not
whether the real number is 20 percent or 30 percent or even half - the
figure of two-thirds is not even plausible, nonetheless WWF loudly
proclaimed it. Huge amounts of the world's forests are found in un-
inhabited regions of Siberia and Canada, for instances. As Lomborg
quickly ascertained, no WWF report actually existed27 and the meth-
odology used was, quite simply, ridiculous. But the real question the
episode raises may not be the methodological errors used in
constructing the figure of two-thirds, but that WWF could even
promulgate such a preposterous figure.28 Was there really no one at
WWF who had the common sense, learning, and integrity to say,
"Wait, this number is utterly implausible"? Moreover, did WWF
believe that the public would be so gullible and the media so lazy as
to accept these figures? Apparently so - which raises important
questions about both the suppliers of the information (WWF) as well
as its consumers (the media and the public) when it comes to
information regarding environmental issues.
23 Id. at 14.
24 Id. at 16.
25 id.
26 Id.
27 id.
28 Since that time, WWF has scaled down its estimate of lost forests to 49.8% - still incor-
rect, but only credulity-straining, not absurd. Id.
[Vol. 53:315
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C. Greenpeace
Greenpeace has asserted that "half the Earth's species are likely
to disappear within the next seventy-five years." 29 Again, this figure
is both factually wrong and facially ridiculous. Given that the actual
species extinction rate is expected to be 0.7 percent during the next
fifty years, 30 "half' of the Earth's species certainly falls outside of the
margin of error for such estimates. But again note that it is not a
question of mere judgment - losing half of the world's species in fifty
years is not a serious number. Nonetheless, the estimate (or similar
estimates) are reported with remarkable frequency in the media.31
As these examples illustrate, as well as others described by
Lomborg throughout The Skeptical Environmentalist, environmental
interest groups have proven themselves dramatically wrong on almost
every environmental and economic trend since their inception in the
1970s. Moreover, many of these errors are not "close calls" or
"judgment calls" on disputed scientific evidence, rather they represent
a simple misreading of unambiguous facts to the contrary or whop-
pers that simply defy common sense and credulity. 32
Given the tendency of environmental interest groups to misrep-
resent the true state of the planet, therefore, the question to be ad-
dressed in the rest of this essay is, "Why?"
II. PUBLIC INTEREST MODEL
Environmentalists often claim that environmental activist groups
and environmental regulation is animated by the "public interest," i.e.,
an outpouring of "civic republicanism" that causes individuals to
overcome their narrow self-interest and to support wide-ranging envi-
ronmental regulatory policies.33  Moreover, it is usually added that
29 id. at 18.
30 Id. at 17.
31 Moreover, "species extinction" is usually illustrated with exotic and charismatic crea-
tures, such as manatees, elephants, and tigers. In reality, only 1.6 million species have been
named, the vast majority of which are insects (such as beetles, ants, flies, and worms), or fungi,
bacteria, or viruses. See id. at 250. One suspects that "Save the Nematode Worms" makes a
less-compelling bumper sticker than "Save the Whales."
32 For instance, the UNEP Global Environmental Outlook Report 2000 claims that
"[w]orldwide, polluted water is estimated to ... contribute to the death of about 15 million
children under five every year." Id. at 18. This casualty toll is indeed large, especially because
WHO estimates that the total number of deaths annually from all causes for children under 5 is
estimated at 10 million. Id. A similar lack of common sense manifests itself in David Pimen-
tel's extraordinary claim that infectious diseases have dramatically increased and will continue
to increase, notwithstanding uniform global improvements in life expectancy. Id. at 26. As
Lomborg queries incredulously, "[w]e must ... wonder how life expectancy can be going up
and up if we keep getting more and more sick?" Id.
3. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment - Explana-
tions for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 29, 31-32 (1998) (de-
scribing "republican" arguments for environmental regulation).
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this spirit of public interest is usually effectuated through a process of
public, deliberative democracy, where all parties debate in order to
reach consensus about the ideal public policy that advances the com-
mon good rather than private gain.
The public interest view of the contribution of environmental in-
terest groups to democratic decision-making is subject to empirical
testing. Several testable implications suggest themselves. First, it
would be predicted that environmental interest groups would strive to
base environmental policy on the best available science and to pro-
vide balanced and accurate information to the public about environ-
mental improvements as well as environmental needs so that the pub-
lic can be fully and accurately informed about the needs of environ-
mental policy. Second, to the extent that environmentalists are sup-
posedly participating in deliberative democratic process, it would be
expected that they would be willing and able to be persuaded by the
arguments of others that other social, economic, and health and safety
goals are more pressing than environmental goals. Third, they would
be willing to endorse regulatory mechanisms that rest on private-
ordering solutions, such as market mechanisms, common law mecha-
nisms, and decentralization of regulatory authority through federal-
ism. A rigorous application of these tests is outside of the scope of
this short essay; nonetheless, a brief review of the evidence suggests
that the public interest model has little descriptive accuracy with re-
spect to the behavior of environmental interest groups.
A. Errors or Bias?
First, a public interest model would predict that environmental
activists would seek to base environmental policy-making on the best
available science. As noted above, it is evident that this is not always
true. At least some of the scientific analysis of some of the most
high-profile environmental groups is simply laughable. Thus, at least
some of the information disseminated by some environmental groups
certainly does not pass the test of best-available science.
Of course, it may just be that environmental groups make errors,
just like everyone else, such that a few errors here or there does not
rebut the belief that environmental activists are doing the best that
they can to sift through the technical and difficult scientific evidence
involving complex environmental issues. If so, then routine errors are
to be expected and are not inconsistent with a public interest story.34
But the evidence rebuts this argument as well. If it were true that
these were just innocent errors, then it would be expected that the er-
14 Although the really big "whoppers" described supra would still fall outside of this zone
of error.
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rors would be randomly distributed around the truth. This would
mean that it would be just as likely for environmental activists to un-
derestimate the seriousness of a problem as to overestimate it. Of
course, this is not the case. Instead, the errors of environmental
groups are systematically biased toward overestimating environ-
mental risks and underestimating improvements in environmental
quality. This systematic bias suggests that environmental groups are
not dispassionately seeking to collect and offer information on envi-
ronmental quality to the public and policy-makers. Instead, they are
advocates for a particular view and are manipulating information
flows to advance their agenda.
B. Priorities and Trade-Offs
Second, if environmental activists were truly motivated by con-
cern for the public good rather than narrow self-interest, then they
would be willing to listen, be persuaded, and to allow other priorities,
such as safety, health, and economic well-being to occasionally take
precedence over their particular environmental priorities. In practice,
however, this is not the case. Indeed, much of the most damning part
of Lomborg's argument is the callous disregard with which environ-
mentalists implicitly dismiss other pressing social priorities in favor
of single-minded pursuit of environmental objectives.
Oceans of law review ink have been spilled defending the notion
that environmental activists are animated by civic republican virtues
and the public good. In this model, citizens come to the public square
to debate social goals and the most effective means to obtain them.
But in practice, environmentalist activists appear to be the one con-
stituency that simply will not shut up and will not listen. Whereas all
other citizens are expected to listen to one another and to persuade
and be persuaded as to why their self-interest and priorities should
yield to environmental goals, there seems to be no issue on which
environmental goals are supposed to yield to other goals. Environ-
mentalism supposedly illustrates civic republican virtues of delibera-
tion and compromise; in practice, environmentalists never deliberate
and never compromise. Instead, they lecture and dictate terms.
Whatever this is, it is most definitely not deliberation. In short, when
environmental goals triumph this is characterized as the public benefit
winning out; when education, safety, or recreation win, this is be-
lieved to be the result of selfishness and short-sightedness. In their
unwillingness to compromise or deliberate, the environmental move-
ment hardly makes a persuasive poster child for civic republicanism.
Two episodes will serve to illustrate the unwillingness of envi-
ronmental interests to compromise in the political arena. First, con-
sider the recent attacks by Defenders of Wildlife (DW) and the Na-
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tional Resources Defense Council (NRDC) against the American
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).35 ALEC is a bipartisan group
or business leaders and state legislators to develop local and private
sector solutions to public issues, such as welfare, economic develop-
ment, and the environment. In response to ALEC's consensus-
building efforts on environmental issues, NRDC and DW have
launched an all-out war against the legitimacy of ALEC's efforts, in-
cluding a web site and a media campaign. So much for consensus-
building through rational deliberation.
The so-called "Quincy Library Affair" also illustrates the opposi-
tion of environmental interest groups to compromise and
accommodation of competing views. The Quincy Library Group was
an informal group formed by local environmentalists in Quincy,
California, a northern California logging area.36  After a fractious
fifteen-year debate over logging, all of the interested parties finally
reached a mutually agreeable compromise, only to see it vetoed by
national interest groups. The national interest groups attempted to
strong-arm the local group to make changes to their plan before the
national environmental groups would support it. Then, when
members of the Quincy Library Group proposed legislation
implementing the agreement, the "national groups stepped up their
attacks," to try to kill the compromise legislation. Little wonder then
that, "Many local groups regard national organizations as more
interested in protecting [the national lobbyists'] turf than in achieving
solutions that advance conservation.,
37
Economic scarcity is a simple fact of life, necessitating priorities
and trade-offs. If a society spends more on pursuing environmental
goals, then it will have fewer resources available for other goals, such
as education, safety, medicine, police, and military protection. These
trade-offs are inherent in life and cannot be wished away, as much as
some would like to do so. 38 Nonetheless, there are few examples of
environmentalists compromising for other goals. Even following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, environmental activists have re-
fused to allow environmental goals to yield to military preparedness.
Consider the ongoing case of Center for Biological Diversity v.
Pirie,39 a case involving the efforts of an environmental interest group
35 See Doug Bandow, Environmental Jihads, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at A14 ("To-
gether the NRDC and DW have mounted a vitriolic campaign against ALEC.").
36 Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, Grass-Roots Seeds of Compromise, WASH.
POST, Oct. 11, 1998, at C3.
37 Id.; see also Tim Fitzgerald, The Quincy Library Affair, PERC REP., Mar. 1998, at 3
(relating the history of the Quincy Library affair).
38 See THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS 16-19 (2002) (comparing the "con-
strained" vision of the world, which recognizes trade-offs, with the "unconstrained" vision,
which does not).
'9 191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164 (D.D.C. 2002).
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to enjoin the military exercises on the island of Farallon de Medinilla,
an uninhabited island "located approximately 45 nautical miles north-
east of Saipan in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Is-
lands. The island is approximately 1.7 miles long and 0.3 miles wide,
with a total area of about 206 acres." 40 Although uninhabited, it is
home to many species of birds and animal life.4 '
But because of its location in the Western Pacific, it is also a
uniquely valuable location for the military to conduct certain training
exercises, and in fact, it has been used for military exercises since
1971. Farallon de Medinilla is necessary to practice bombing exer-
cises, "as it is the only air-to-ground target range under the control of
the United States in the Western Pacific. '' 2 It is also the only locale
that can be used for practicing large-scale amphibious landings, as
well as the only U.S.-controlled target ranger in the Western Pacific
Theater for practicing sea-to-land artillery and coordinated actions
between the Navy and Marines for naval-supported amphibious land-
ings.43 In fact, since September 11, 2001, the importance and use of
Farallon de Medinilla for military preparedness has increased.44
Thus, Farallon de Medinilla is uniquely valuable for military ex-
ercises, and has become more so in the post-September 11 period.
Nonetheless, Center for Biological Diversity brought an action under
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, winning an injunction earlier this year
that halted the military's use of the island.45 In short, the ruling by the
District Court for the District of Columbia amounts to little less than ajudicially-mandated "cease fire" order affecting military actions thou-
sands of miles away on an uninhabited island in the Western Pacific.
It is difficult to understand how this lawsuit reflects "civic republi-
can" values.
The implications of this tunnel vision are striking. Consider the
Kyoto Protocol on global warming. To the extent that global warm-
ing is in fact occurring and is irreversible (and not just a short-term
anomaly related to sunspots, global cloud cover, or measurement er-
rors), it is now generally acknowledged that the temperate climates
that prevail in the developed world will be unaffected or even im-
proved by moderate warming, whereas tropical third-world countries
will be almost certainly harmed, perhaps substantially. Lomborg ob-
serves that to implement the Kyoto Protocol will likely cost at least
40 Id. at 164.
41 id.
42 Id. at 168. Absent Farallon de Medinilla, the Navy would have to request permission
from other countries to use their territories for bombing practice, leaving the military "at the
mercy of host governments for [their] readiness and training." Id. at 170 (quoting Declaration
of Vice Admiral James W. Metzger).
41 Id. at 168-69.
4 Id. at 169.
45 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113, 122 (D.D.C. 2002).
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$150 billion a year, and possibly much more. At the same time,
"UNICEF estimates that just $70-80 billion a year could give all
Third World inhabitants access to the basics like health, education,
water and sanitation. 46 Thus, for one-half of the annual cost of
Kyoto, the world could supply the entire water, health, sanitation, and
education needs of the Third World instead. "More important still,"
Lomborg observes, "is the fact that if we could muster such a massive
investment in the present-day developing countries this would also
give them a much better future position in terms of resources and in-
frastructure from which to manage a future global warming., 47 It is
estimated that if we could provide clean drinking water and sanitation
to the entire world, "this would avoid several million deaths every
year and prevent half a billion people becoming seriously ill each
year. 4 8 Given the choice between averting a minor amount of the
effects of possible global warming 100 years from now through the
Kyoto Treaty and having clean water and sanitation today that would
save millions of lives, the latter seems far more pressing. Stated more
bluntly, how many people are environmentalists willing to kill in or-
der to slow (not even reverse) anthropocentric global-warming, even
assuming that it is real and important?
Lomborg also notes that in Peru, "the authorities refrained from
chlorinating the drinking water because they were afraid of the risk of
cancer." 49 Today, that decision is considered to have been a major
reason for the cholera epidemic that broke out in 1991. Given the
tiny cancer risk associated with chlorinating water, a massive cholera
epidemic is a stunning price to pay for junk science.
But it is not merely on global issues that the lack of perspective
arises. Investments in environmental regulations are far more costly
in terms of lives saved than almost any other form of regulation. In
comparison to investments in health care, transportation (e.g., safer
highways), and occupational protection, environmental regulations
are vastly more expensive. 50 To the extent that pursuing exotic envi-
ronmental concerns distracts public attention and resources from
more practical and realistic concerns, the end result is to ensure that
more people will die than would be the case if more rational priorities
were pursued.
Ignoring the need for trade-offs also means that many of these
environmental scares are simply counterproductive to public safety
and welfare. For instance, many environmental activists have
46 LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 322.
47 Id.
41 Id. at 20.
41 Id. at 350.
50 See id. at 340-42.
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adopted the goal of completely eliminating pesticide use or sharply
curtailing its use, purportedly with the goal of eliminating a cancer
risk from water runoff. On the other hand, reducing pesticide use will
substantially increase the price of fruits and vegetables because of
their vulnerability to disease. As the price rises, people will consume
fewer of them. Because eating fruit and vegetables are a key to re-
ducing the risk of cancer, consuming fewer fruits and vegetables ac-
tually will lead to a higher incidence of cancer. In contrast, the risk
of cancer from pesticides is very, very small.51 Thus, once again the
human casualty toll of misplaced environmental hysteria will be
large.
A final tradeoff is between environmental protection and eco-
nomic growth. In general, greater economic growth leads to a cleaner
environment over time. To be sure, it may be that early in an econ-
omy's development, the environment gets worse as a result of more
intense industrialization. But over time, greater wealth expands the
opportunity set of a country, permitting the accomplishment of a myr-
iad of social goals that were previously unattainable, including great
environmental amenities. Lomborg observes:
In general we need to confront our myth of the econ-
omy undercutting the environment. We have grown to be-
lieve that we are faced with an inescapable choice between
higher economic welfare and a greener environment. But
surprisingly and as will be documented throughout this
book, environmental development often stems from eco-
nomic development - only when we get sufficiently rich can
we afford the relative luxury of caring about the environ-
ment.
52
Similarly, early in the life cycle of environmental regulation, it is easy
to identify and implement environmental policies that are economi-
cally efficient, in that the net social benefits outweigh the costs that
are imposed. But to the extent that regulation persists past the point
of optimality, it will become a drain on the economy, dampening eco-
nomic growth.53 Adopting inefficient regulatory policies today will
"' Id. at 10.
52 Id. at 32-33 (citations omitted).
53 See Robert W. Hahn, United States Environmental Policy: Past, Present and Future, 34
NAT. RESOURCES J. 305, 332 (1994) (noting that costs of 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
significantly exceeded benefits); David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the
Foundations of Environmental Law in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 176-77(1995) ("Most of the many attempts to measure the costs of this inefficiency place the costs of
command and control regulation anywhere from 50% to many times greater than market-based
alternatives."). For general discussions of the efficiency of regulatory alternatives to the current
regime, see DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1990); see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE
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make a country poorer, which limits its flexibility to pursue environ-
mental and other policies in the future.
Moreover, adopting inefficient policies today means that society
will be poorer forever. Much is made of the "precautionary princi-
ple," which requires added scrutiny for any action or inaction whose
results will be potentially irreversible, such as habitat for endangered
species or filling a swamp.54 The problem with the argument is that
almost every human activity is either completely irreversible or irre-
versible only at large cost. If money is spent on compliance with
Kyoto instead of providing water and sanitation to the Third World,
the result will be that millions of people will die, an irreversible re-
sult. Perhaps more dramatically, economic growth is cumulative,
meaning that a country's GDP next year is in large part a function of
its GDP this year. Thus, once a country is made poorer than it would
have been but for the inefficient regulation, that country will always
be poorer. Its growth path is irreversibly altered because of ineffi-
cient regulation. Not only will a society's opportunity set be con-
stricted, but it will constrict a whole host of other life amenities such
as leisure from reduced work, the opportunity to retire, and the oppor-
tunity to live a full and healthful life. Because the country will be
poorer in the future than it otherwise would have been, this limits its
future choices - irreversibly.
Lomborg observes that the effect of economic growth on human
welfare has been profound. In the course of the just the past 40 years,
the entire world has become three times richer, developed and devel-
oping world alike.55 Over the past 200 years, Americans have be-
come 36 times richer. This increasing wealth has made available
clean water, cars, computers, air transportation, and telephones. Not
to mention the environmental improvements caused by the automo-
bile - considering that prior to the invention of the internal combus-
tion engine the streets and rivers of New York City literally ran with
horse manure, concerns about the possibility of global warming and
drilling in the remote Arctic seem somewhat attenuated. Illiteracy has
fallen dramatically throughout the world; expected lifespans have
risen dramatically and childhood mortality has fallen dramatically.
56
The death of children under age 14 has fallen by 95 percent since
1900, and has been halved in just the past 20 years in India, Egypt,
Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, South Korea, Israel and many other
nations. 57 In short, increased wealth is not an end in itself; rather, it is
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975) (discussing the economic theory behind economic
policies aimed at improving quality of life).
4 See LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 348-49.
" Id. at 328.
56 Id.
57 Stephen Moore, Surer Way to Sustain the Planet, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at A21.
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a necessary condition that makes possible the development of the en-
tire range of human capabilities including health, education, environ-
mental quality, and the ingredients of a rewarding life.58
Finally, focusing on the costs to the environment ignores the op-
portunity cost of status quo policies. It may be the case in a particular
situation that destroying a habitat might lead to the extinction of a
particular species. But, on the other hand, the creation of a new habi-
tat will invariably lead to other species filling the new habitat niche,
whether by the adaptation of an old species to the new environment or
through the evolution of a new species. Preserving the status quo
thus has the effect of foreclosing the emergence of new environ-
mental niches and new species, a result which is ignored by the pre-
cautionary principle. Thus, the precautionary principle appears to be
an incoherent slogan rather than a useful analytical tool. Any human
action or inaction has some consequences that will be irreversible -
there is some opportunity cost or unchosen path foreclosed by every
decision or action.
If environmental activists were truly acting according to a public
benefit model of government, then they would make some effort to
try to prioritize environmental goals relative to other social goals
(education, terrorism prevention, crime prevention, national defense),
other health and safety goals, and economic growth. Instead, there
appears to be no effort to justify the pursuit of environmental goals
relative to these other goals; instead there is a single-minded pursuit
of short-term environmental goals over all other social goals.
C. Receptivity to Regulatory Alternatives
A final conundrum presents itself for those who would try to ex-
plain the behavior of environmental interest groups through a public
interest model. This is the persistent resistance of most organizations
to regulatory alternatives that deliver the same or better environ-
mental quality at much-lower cost and greater flexibility than tradi-
tional command-and-control regulation. The inefficiency and cum-
bersome nature of extant environmental regulation has led to numer-
ous proposals for its reform, including greater reliance on traditional
concepts of property rights and common law,5 9 tradable permit re-
58 See Peter Boettke & John R. Subrick, The Rule of Law and Human Capabilities, 10
SuP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2003); see also LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 4 ("Mankind's
lot has actually improved in terms of practically every measurable indicator.").
59 See YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note
2; Unanimity-Reinforcing, supra note 7 (arguing the applicability of common law remedies to
large-number externalities); see also MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY 259-78(1978) (asserting private property rights as a means of controlling the depletion of natural re-
sources and pollution).
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gimes, and decentralization of regulatory power through federalism.60
Each of these approaches offers possibly huge increases in efficiency
and environmental protection when compared to the centralized sys-
tem of command-and-control regulation that prevails in most areas of
environmental regulation today.61 Nonetheless, they have been al-
most uniformly rejected by environmental activists as useful mecha-
nisms for environmental regulation.
62
Again, the position of environmental interest groups largely
speaks for itself. Comparable environmental protection is available
for much lower cost than under the current regime. Again, a reduc-
tion in regulatory cost leaves greater resources available today and
tomorrow to solve other pressing social needs. Nonetheless, envi-
ronmental activists almost uniformly oppose these innovations, a po-
sition that is difficult to square with a public interest model of regula-
tion.
D. Summary
Many scholars have contented that the behavior of environ-
mental interest groups can be best-explained through the public inter-
est model of regulation. This section has evaluated the behavior of
environmental interest groups in order to test the public interest
model in explaining the behavior of environmental interest groups.
Although the examination has been more impressionistic than scien-
tific, the model has not fared well. The public interest model suggests
at least three tests of its validity in this context: (1) basing policy on
the best-available science, (2) engaging in good-faith public delibera-
tion over social and economic priorities, and (3) willingness to con-
sider alternative means to accomplish desired environmental goals.
The actual behavior of environmental interest groups is not consistent
with any of these tests, casting doubt on the validity of the public in-
terest model as a valid explanation of the behavior of environmental
60 See Jonathan R. Macey & Henry N. Butler, Federalism and the Environment, in THE
COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINGING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 158 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000) (applying
federalism "to the allocation of power over decision making regarding environmental issues);
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210 (1992).
61 The American environmental law system has been referred to as one of the largest
centralized, command-and-control systems still in existence. See Richard B. Stewart, Control-
ling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 154
(1988) ("[Tlhe system [of federal control over environmental policy] has grown to the point
where it amounts to nothing less than a massive effort at Soviet-style central planning of the
economy to achieve environmental goals.").
62 The most notable exception was the support of the NRDC for the permit-trading
scheme created under the Clean Air Act. Other exceptions appear to be rare.
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activist groups. This suggests that it might be fruitful to look else-
where for an explanation.
III. PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL
This section will proffer an alternative model to explain the be-
havior of environmental interest groups - a public choice model.63
By contrasting this model with the public interest model just de-
scribed, it will become apparent that the traditional portrayal of envi-
ronmental interest groups as selfless "Baptists" seeking to advance
the public interest is short-sighted. Instead, the behavior of environ-
mental interest groups can be best predicted through a public choice
model that views their behavior as the result of the self-interest of the
organizations and their leaders. Like any other lobbying organization,
they are seeking to maximize their wealth, power, and private gain
through the political lobbying process. 64 Moreover, like other interest
groups, environmental interest groups use the political process to se-
cure benefits for themselves and their members and to force other
members of the public to pay for them.
The environmental lobby has a strong stake in the current regula-
tory system, in that the command-and-control regime gives it massive
control over the creation, implementation, and enforcement of envi-
ronmental laws and regulation.65 Environmental interest groups play
a controlling role under the current regulatory system, from control-
ling information flows to politicians and regulators to generating leg-
islative proposals and drafting statutory language. They also exercise
primary responsibility for implementation of the law through their
many lawsuits to enforce various statutory and regulatory provisions.
Indeed, they have the power to effectively stop almost any major
regulatory reform with which they disagree, even preventing them
from reaching the floor of Congress.66 Indeed, through strategic use
of litigation and lobbying pressure they can frustrate and effectively
override the policy decisions of the democratically-elected branches
of government.-
67
63 A more detailed specification of the model can be found in Environmental External-
ities, supra note 3.
64 See R. Shep Melnick, Strange Bedfellows Make Normal Politics: An Essay, 9 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 75, 82 (1998).
65 See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 59, 70-73 (1992).
66 See JONATHAN ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: GREEN ACTIVISM
IN AMERICA xvi-xvii (1995) (describing efforts by environmental lobbyists to kill regulatory
reforms following the 1994 elections that resulted in Republican control of Congress and the
Senate).
67 See Farber, supra note 65, at 73 (describing use of strategic litigation and lobbying by
environmentalists to obstruct policies of James Watt, former Secretary of the Interior Depart-
ment).
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In large part, the stranglehold that environmental lobbyists exer-
cise over environmental policy-making is the result of the public per-
ception that these groups are, in fact, acting according to the public
interest. Lomborg notes that "[p]olls show that people have much
more trust in the environmental groups to protect the environment
than in business (78 percent versus 38 percent) or even the EPA (72
percent). 68 As shown in Part II, however, the public interest model
of regulation does not persuasively explain the behavior of environ-
mental interest groups. What about a public choice model?
A. Errors or Bias?
It would not be accurate to charge that environmental interest
groups always distort scientific evidence. But it is accurate to ob-
serve that they frequently distort the scientific evidence that they re-
ceive and they uniformly bias their errors toward making environ-
mental conditions and trends seem worse than they actually are. This
systematic bias provides powerful evidence against the public interest
model of their behavior.
But this bias toward "bad news" and distortion of fact is squarely
consistent with a public choice model of their behavior. Environ-
mental interest groups are substantial organizations, with tens of
thousands of members, multi-million dollar budgets, and substantial
litigation and lobbying expenses. 69 By the early 1990s, there were
approximately seven thousand environmental groups.70  From the
early 1970s to 1990, the NRDC's membership tripled, the Environ-
mental Defense Fund's quintupled, the Sierra Club's septupled, and
the National Audubon Society's octupled. Today, Defenders of Wild-
life has an annual budget of $16 million and NRDC has a budget of
$39 million.7' In 1997, the National Wildlife Federation had over 4
million members and $80 million in revenues; its president earned
more than $300,000 per year in pay and benefits.72 Running such a
large and expensive operation requires a constant flow of funds. In
seeking to raise money to fund their myriad activities, it appears that
"bad news" about the environment sells better than "good news."
Lomborg suggests that the message of environmental destruction
"taps deeply into our doomsday beliefs" which scare people into sup-
porting the efforts of environmental interest groups.73 Just as fears of
68 LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 360 n.273 (citations omitted).
69 See Melnick, supra note 64, at 93-94 (summarizing members, budget, and staff of ma-
jor environmental interest groups in the appendix).
" JONATHAN RAUCH, GOVERNMENT'S END: WHY WASHINGTON STOPPED WORKING 47
(rev. ed. 1999).
71 See Doug Bandow, supra note 35, at A14.
72 RAUCH, supra note 70, at 48.
73 LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 12.
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the Judgment Day induce individuals to open their wallets at church,
fears of a coming environmental apocalypse motivate individuals to
believe the myths of environmental evangelists and to take action.
Because bigger scares lead to bigger contributions, scaring the public
is an effective mechanism for environmental activists to build their
war chests and to sustain their organizations. When given the choice
between factual accuracy and a gripping fund-raising letter, there is
strong evidence that the latter prevails. As Greenpeace admits, "The
truth is that many environmental issues we fought for ten years back
are as good as solved. Even so, the strategy continues to focus on the
assumption that 'everything is going to hell. 74
Because the perception of environmental crisis is necessary for
their existence, environmental interest groups also face an inherent
conflict of interest with respect to making accurate and truthful repre-
sentations of the environmental record. As Lomborg observes, the
Danish president of WWF stated, "we in the WWF are greatly look-
ing forward to seeing [Lomborg's] 'facts' about how the species are
not being wiped out and that the global warming worries can be can-
celled. We will jump for joy if he is right."75 But as Lomborg re-
marks, "But really, we can decode this writing - it is not obvious that
the WWF would jump for joy, because after all, then what would be
the raison d'etre of the organization? '76 And this really reaches the
core issue - without the constant perception of environmental crisis, it
would be financially impossible to sustain the activities of the numer-
ous environmental organizations out there. The simple fact is that
those who work at these establishments like their jobs, and clearly
prefer them over any alternative employment. It gives them power,
prestige, and in many cases, substantial income. It allows them to
pursue their ideological passions full-time. Thus, environmental
problems are never declared "solved" or "improved" - there is always
some dramatic problem that needs the further involvement of envi-
ronmental activist groups and their battery of lobbyists and lawyers.77
Professor David Schoenbrod has recently observed that the po-
litical power of the environmentalist movement rests on many factors,
from widespread (albeit often misplaced) fears about pollution "to the
wholly laudable conservationist instincts of ordinary people. But," he
adds, "the authority of the movement rests above all on its claim to
speak for, and in the name of, science." 78 As the use of science be-
comes increasingly intertwined with politics, it is becoming increas-
74 Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
75 Id. at 360 n.274 (citations omitted).
76 Id. at 360 n.274.
77 Id. at 11.
78 David Schoenbrod, The Mau-Mauing ofBjorn Lomborg, COMMENTARY, Sept. 2002, at
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ingly evident that environmental interest groups are not interested in
science for its truth value, but rather as a means for policy advance-
ment. Indeed, it may not be long until the scientific claims of envi-
ronmental interest groups are treated with the same mix of amuse-
ment and incredulity that greet the pronouncements by tobacco com-
panies that smoking does not cause cancer.
Further contributing to the bias in science is the nature of much
scientific funding. Neutral readers are rightly skeptical of research
sponsored by particular industries that support the policy positions of
those same industries. But similar pressures exist throughout the
world of scientific funding. Aksel Wiin-Nielsen, former Secretary-
General of the UN World Meteorological Organization poses the
problem, in this case in the context of research on global warming:
"The most important explanation as to why so much extensive theo-
retical work in the development of climate models has been done dur-
ing the last ten years is that the development of models sustains fund-
ing and secures jobs at research institutions., 79 Or, as has been re-
marked more colloquially elsewhere, if a Congressman offers you $1
million to study the "problem" of global warming and its possible
solutions, it is awfully difficult to turn down the money on the ground
that there is no problem to "solve." In fact, it has been argued that "it
was actually the climate researchers, together with for example the
windmill manufacturers and environment bureaucracies, who were
the primary political initiators of the climate negotiations. 8 °
Roger A. Pielke, Jr., has recently identified in Nature why sci-
ence has become so political.81 Pielke attributes the problem to an
"iron triangle" of mutually reinforcing interests that consists of politi-
cians, scientists, and environmental activists. Politicians seek to
avoid the consequences of having to make a decision, and so are ea-
ger to pass to scientists the responsibility of not only providing scien-
tific results, but also proffering policy recommendations. To com-
plete this abdication of responsibility, they identify the question as
one of "science," not politics. Next is the scientist, "being offered
resources to perform research not only to expand knowledge in the
field, but to resolve important policy issues. Two birds with one
stone !,,82 The scientist accepts the research funds, but also the obliga-
tion to provide policy answers as well. But scientists have no particu-
lar expertise in recommending public policy, which often requires
consideration of a host of factors for which scientists have no particu-
79 LOMBORG, supra note, 5 at 37 (quoting Aksel Wiin-Nielson).
80 Id. at 38 (citing article from the journal Energy Policy).
8' Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Policy, Politics and Perspective: The Scientific Community Must
Distinguish Analysis from Advocacy, 416 NATURE 367, 367-68 (March 28, 2002).
82 Id. at 368.
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lar expertise, such as economics, philosophy, and politics. Nonethe-
less, accepting public funding has obligated, and empowered, him to
provide "answers." On the third comer of the triangle is the advocate,
sometimes from industry but often from environmental interest
groups. As Pielke observes, the advocate is "looking for scientific
data to provide a compelling justification for his political, societal,
environmental or business goal. 83 Because science is used by politi-
cians to try to resolve controversial public policy issues, and by advo-
cates to influence those decisions, in the end this politicization sacri-
fices the very scientific impartiality that provided the impetus for sci-
entific support in the first place. As Pielke grimaces, "Science is be-
coming yet another playing field for power politics, complete with the
trappings of media spin and a win-at-all-costs attitude. Sadly, much
of what science can offer policy-makers, and hence society, is being
lost.,
,84
B. Priorities and Trade-Offs
Often the distortions are a purposeful attempt to frighten the pub-
lic in order to raise funds for the organization. The early prototype
for this strategy was the infamous "Alar Scare" of the late 1980s.85
As NRDC's publicist David Fenton reported at the time, "A modest
investment by NRDC re-paid itself many-fold in tremendous media
exposure (and substantial, immediate revenue for future pesticide
work). In this sense, we submit this campaign as a model for other
non-profit organizations. 86
More fundamentally, the science that underlay the NDRC's
claims about Alar was unusually bad.87 There was no evidence of its
effect on humans and the single study that provided the basis for the
attacks was a study done over a decade earlier, where laboratory ani-
mals were exposed to Alar levels some 266,000 times higher than
humans would be exposed to. This dubious study about the carcino-
genic effects of Alar was combined with an equally dubious study
about the exposure of children to Alar on apples and in apple juice.
When combined, however, these two studies set off a media feeding-
frenzy and a public panic. Indeed, the scare campaign began to work
too well - "Soon school systems began banning apples (which is not
what NRDC intended or recommended). 88 One subsequent study
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See How a PR Firm Executed the Alar Scare, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1989, §1, at 22; see
also CYNTHIA CROSSEN, TAINTED TRUTH: THE MANIPULATION OF FACT IN AMERICA 54-58
(1994).
86 How a PR Firm Executed the Alar Scare, supra note 85.
87 CROSSEN, supra note 85, at 56-67.
88 How a PR Firm Executed the Alar Scare, supra note 85.
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reported that in response to the scare 26 percent of people said they
had reduced their consumption of fruit and vegetables because of fear
of pesticides, which of course substantially increased their overall
health risk.89
It was observed above9° and need not be belabored here that en-
vironmental activists are not willing to make trade-offs between envi-
ronmental goals and other pressing policy goals, even goals that seem
far more urgent by any rational analysis.
C. Receptivity to Regulatory Alternatives
In general, environmental interest groups are opposed to the
adoption of regulatory alternatives to the command-and-control sys-
tem that has been constructed over the past several decades. As
noted, this opposition is difficult to square with a public interest the-
ory of regulation, because this obstinacy increases the cost of envi-
ronmental regulation, reducing economic welfare and constricting the
resources available to solve other pressing social problems. Perhaps
this is inadvertent, and their preference for command-and-control
regulation is just an accident, and thus is not inconsistent with a pub-
lic interest view. On closer inspection, however, this explanation also
does not appear accurate. Instead, the preference of professional en-
vironmental interest groups for continued command-and-control regu-
lation can be most persuasively explained as an outgrowth of their
private interest. Under the command-and-control scheme of envi-
ronmental regulation, environmental interest groups play an essential
role; indeed, they are crucially involved at every stage of the process,
from the initiation of new legislation or regulation, through its draft-
ing and enactment, and finally in its implementation. They hold the
keys to the political kingdom, and suitors must pay tribute to them to
be heard. The pivotal role at every stage of the process maximizes
the power and money that flows to these groups. By contrast, almost
every alternative regulatory system, such as pollution taxes or trad-
able permits, are systems that are basically self-regulating. They re-
quire no ongoing monitoring and tinkering, and minimal governmen-
tal intervention.
It has been suggested that the massive powers given to environ-
mental interest groups is justified because environmental quality is a
public good, and that environmental activist groups help to overcome
the transaction costs and free-riders barriers to environmental legisla-
tion.9' But this argument is far too facile. Efficient environmental
89 CROSSEN, supra note 85, at 57-58.
9 See supra text accompanying notes 35-58.
91 See Farber, supra note 65, at 71-75; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Public Choice Revisited, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1715, 1742 (1998).
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policy is also a public good, as are many of the other goods that com-
pete with environmental protection for scarce resources, such as
health, transportation, education, etc. And, in fact, environmental
interest groups face crippling conflicts of interest that historically
have deterred efforts to improve the efficiency of the environmental
regulatory system or to decentralize decision-making authority.
Lomborg observes that people naturally view industry's argu-
ments "with a certain natural skepticism because they know that the
argument could also be a cover for ulterior motives." But he adds:
This considered, it seems amazing that many people are not
equally aware that the environmental organizations also have
an interest in environmental regulation. It may be that the
environmental organizations have better arguments for regu-
lation (but of course their arguments may also be poorer), but
it ought to be obvious that they, too, have an interest in argu-
ing towards a particular end.92
He continues:
Thus as the industry and farming organizations have an
obvious interest in portraying the environment as just-fine
and no-need-to-do-anything, the environmental organiza-
tions also have a clear interest in telling us that the environ-
ment is in a bad state, and that we need to act now. And the
worse they can make this state appear, the easier it is for
them to convince us we need to spend money on the envi-
ronment rather than on hospitals, kindergartens, etc. Of
course, if we were equally skeptical of both sorts of organi-
zation there would be less of a problem. But since we tend
to treat environmental organizations with much less skepti-
cism, this might cause a grave bias in our understanding of
the state of the world.
93
It does, in fact, seem obvious that the primary motivation for
leaders and contributors to environmental interest groups is to pro-
vide private benefits for themselves, rather than public benefits.
In this, they truly are just like any other interest group. It is the
rare interest group that exists simply to provide undifferentiated
public goods. National defense is also a public good (even more
so than the environment), yet "Pro-defense" organizations are gen-
erally understood to be stalking horses of military suppliers. Edu-
cation is a public good, yet we recognize that the National Educa-
tion Association is not simply interested in improving education, it
92 LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 38 (emphasis added).
9' Id. at 38-39.
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is also interested in enriching its members. Social security has
public good elements, yet we don't allow AARP to unilaterally set
retirement policy.
As Lomborg observes, industry lobbying organizations:
[H]ave an interest in protecting their members and they work
to promote decisions which are to the advantage of their
members. In exactly the same way, environmental organiza-
tions base their activities on a desire to promote decisions
which are good for their members.
The difference is that while the traditional organizations
usually fight for traditional values such as the distribution of
time and money, the environmental organizations fight for
such things as bigger forests, diversity of species, restoration
of natural environments and strict regulations of chemicals.94
The fact is, environmentalists care privately and personally about
these goals - they are part of their personal preferences, not merely a
public benefit. Individual preferences are often a black box - some
like Britney, others prefer Beethoven. It is clear that members of
these organizations gain some psychic benefit from their membership,
both from a belief that they are doing the "right thing" as well as for
the community that it makes them a part of.95 To the extent that indi-
viduals pursue a religious preference, political preference, or prefer-
ence for environmental protection over other social goals, it is still the
case that they are pursuing their self-interest and self-gratification. In
many cases, it is the act of sacrificing money or time in support of the
cause that is an essential attribute of the expression of the preference.
Whether these preferences are generated internally or through social
pressures is beside the point; what matters is that once chosen, what
appears to be publicly-motivated (and may in fact be partially pub-
licly-motivated) may also be nothing more than an expression of pri-
vate interest.
96
Thus, it is true that many forms of environmental protection are
public goods - but many other activities also have attributes of public
goods. It is not simply enough to observe that those who favor envi-
ronmental protection will find pro-environment policies hard to pro-
94 Id. at 38.
95 This latter factor should not be understated - casual observation suggests that members
of environmental groups are more eager to proclaim their affiliations through display of bumper
stickers, t-shirts, etc., than are members of other groups. For instance, people rarely proclaim
their memberships in specific churches, suggesting that there is some social element associated
with proclaiming oneself a supporter of a particular environmental organization.
96 See Schroeder, supra note 33, at 39-41 (describing model of "thick self-interest," which
includes these considerations).
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duce because collective action make it difficult to organize effective
lobbying activities. The proper comparison is the relative ability of
environmental lobbyists to organize as compared to groups and indi-
viduals who seek other public goods - better schools, better defense,
and lower taxes. The analysis is comparative, not absolute. Even if it
correct that environmental organizations have more difficulty orga-
nizing as compared to industry, "environmental groups still have a
huge comparative advantage relative to the mass of unorganized con-
sumers who suffer from inefficient regulation. The collective action
problems of environmental lobbying groups are trivial in comparison
to those of the public." 97 "Among citizen groups," it has been noted:
taxpayer and consumer organizations may face greater free-
riding problems than environmental groups: their lobbying
actions are likely to have an even wider range of potential
beneficiaries; they may be able to offer fewer material incen-
tives; and they lack the compelling moral mission that may
drive the purposive incentives motivating members of envi-
ronmental groups.98
And, in fact, an examination of their record suggests that envi-
ronmental interest groups do not in fact tend to claim credit for the
public good of improved environmental quality. Instead, they
"privatize" their accomplishments by seeking to claim credit for the
enactment of certain laws, promulgation of identifiable regulations, or
victories in specific litigation. It is only by producing these identifi-
able private outputs that enables environmental interest groups to
shake the money tree for donations. This desire to produce private
rather than public goods creates at least three distorting influences on
the structure of environmental policy-making.
First, it creates an inherent bias toward command-and-control
centralized policy-making. The traditional command-and-control
structure of environmental regulation necessarily opens opportunities
for environmental interest groups to play a highly influential role in
the legislative and regulatory process. By contrast, decentralized sys-
tems of regulation, such as common law or market-based innovations
such as tradable permits, require little ongoing regulatory interven-
tion. Once established, these systems largely run themselves, subject
to nonpolitical measuring and monitoring of actual emissions. For
instance, there is no federal regulatory agency that regulates the col-
ors of cars, meaning that all transactions regarding the colors of cars
are conducted by private interactions. By contrast, regulation does
97 Environmental Externalities, supra note 3, at 850.
98 Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental
Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 331-32 (1998).
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establish emissions regulations, and indeed, in some situations the
precise technologies that are permitted or banned. Like the current
system of choosing cars by private action, adopting a self-regulating
system would completely eliminate the need for the continued input
of environmental interest groups, substantially reducing their power
and prestige, and with it their public need.
In addition, many of these regulations are enforced by private
citizen-suit provisions, which gives environmental interest groups
control not only the implementation of the regulations, but a valuable
new pot of money to tap into to fund their operations. And indeed,
there is compelling evidence that the litigation patterns of these or-
ganizations can be best explained by their desire to maximize reve-
nues from the attorneys' fees provisions provided by the enabling leg-
islation as well as the unique structure of litigation settlements in this
area rather than to best-ameliorate environmental harms. 99 Environ-
mental interest groups focus much of their litigation efforts on the
provision of private goods to themselves and their members, rather
than the public good of environmental quality. So, for instance, a
substantial portion of litigation for environmental interest groups fo-
cuses on violations of technical violation of permit requirements and
the like, rather than actual environmental harm. As Michael Greve
notes, "the pattern and scope of private enforcement are determined
not, as intended, by its expected public benefits, but rather by the en-
forcers' expected rewards or, more precisely, the 'spread' between the
costs and the benefits of enforcement to the enforcer."'100
Moreover, the command-and-control nature of environmental
controls creates a demand for ongoing amendments to prior laws. As
new technologies develop or economic and environmental circum-
stances change, it is necessary for Congress and EPA to return to
prior enactments to determine whether they should be updated, and if
so, how they should be updated. Thus, as legislation and regulation
expands, it does so exponentially. Not only are there new legislative
and regulatory initiatives to push and defend, there is an ongoing re-
visiting of earlier enactments. By tying regulation to articulated tech-
nologies or emissions, obsolescence is embedded in the regulation
itself. Regulation is designed so that it will require constant political
99 See Environmental Externalities, supra note 3, at 883-86; see also Spence, supra note
53, at 168 (noting that citizen suits have "raised significant revenues" for environmental organi-
zations).
10o Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen
Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE
REWARDS 105, 110-11 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds., 1990); see also A.H. Bar-
nett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations on Citizen-Suit Provisions of Environmental
Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL' Y F. 1 (2001). Under the Clean Water Act, for instance,
attorney fees are generally awarded and set according to prevailing market rates for attorneys,
rather than the actual cost of the environmental group's attorneys.
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review and political tinkering by subsequent legislatures and regula-
tors. This creates a constant demand for input from environmental
interests.
A second result of the focus on private benefits instead of public
is that environmental interest groups are led to downplay actual envi-
ronmental improvements. The continued financial viability of envi-
ronmental interest groups depends on the need for more legislation,
more regulation, and more litigation. As a result, it is necessary for
environmental lobbyists to create an atmosphere that constantly re-
quires more intervention and "tougher regulations." Oddly, this com-
bination seems persuasive to much of the public - tougher and
tougher regulations are passed, yet somehow the environment sup-
posedly gets worse and worse.
Third, the focus on enacting specific rules makes them a valu-
able coalition partner for Bootleggers. As noted, many of the benefits
of environmental protection in fact can be explained through private
benefit to environmental interest groups and the fact that although
there are some collective action problems, environmental interest
groups are relatively well-organized compared to those who bear the
costs of the regulations. Economically efficient environmental regula-
tion, by contrast, is a public good. The presence of environmental
regulation is not overly puzzling, therefore, because of the private
gains it can generate on the other hand, efficient environmental regu-
lation is predictably underproduced. Because much of the cost of in-
efficient regulation is borne by unorganized consumers, there is no
effective lobby for enactment of efficient regulation. By contrast, it is
now well-understood that environmental regulation can be an effec-
tive means for transferring economic rents to particular firms and in-
dustries.
Environmental interest groups provide a uniquely valuable coali-
tion partner for Bootleggers seeking to use environmental regulation
to gain competitive advantage or to transfer wealth to themselves. In
general, environmental interest-groups are concerned primarily with
the end-result of environmental protection, not the means used to se-
cure it. Provided that all mechanisms generate comparable end-
results, environmentalists will be indifferent between whether a more-
efficient or less-efficient regulatory mechanism is adopted. There is
simply nothing in their narrow charter that would lead them to care
whether economic efficiency is aided or hindered between two differ-
ent mechanisms. Because environmental interests care primarily
about ends, not means, they can provide a useful coalition partner to
industry Bootleggers that can use environmental regulation for com-
parative advantage. Bootleggers care primarily about means, and in
particular, recognize that particular forms of regulation can aid them
2002]
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while other forms harm them.10 1 Whereas environmentalists have no
preference for efficient over inefficient regulations, industry lobbyists
will certainly have a preference for wealth-enhancing over wealth-
reducing regulation. And in fact, environmental groups actually will
not be indifferent in the choice of means; as noted, they will have an
inherent bias toward command-and-control regulation, notwithstand-
ing the fact that these mechanisms almost invariably are less-efficient
than alternatives. As such, their preferences ally well with those of
industries and firms that also favor command-and-control regulation.
This convergence of interests between industry and environmental
groups may explain the otherwise puzzling financial support of some
industry for certain environmental interest groups. 10 2 In fact, it is easy
to overstate the public support for these organizations: one-third of
their budget comes from foundation giving rather than individual do-
nations. 10 3 Substantial portions are also generated by litigation fees,
settlements, and government grants.
l1 n
It thus appears that it is neither helpful nor accurate to think of
environmental regulation as a purely public good. Because there are
almost infinite claims for potential public goods, modeling all such
goods as public goods is largely pointless. This problem is made
manifest once it is recognized that the production of many goods are
fundamentally incompatible with one another. For instance, individ-
ual health and safety is also a good, and in a welfare state, a public
good. Driving larger and heavier cars tends to increase safety by re-
ducing physical injury and the risk of death in the event of accident.
But larger and heavier cars also tend to get worse gas mileage and
emit more pollutants than smaller alternatives. Thus, environmental
quality is maximized by driving smaller and lighter cars. Both health
and environmental quality have attributes of public goods, and little is
accomplished by describing both as public goods that can somehow
both be "undersupplied," as an increase in one can come only by de-
creasing the supply of the other.
Thus, the choice of environmental quality over safety (or vice-
versa) cannot be anything other than one of pure private preference
aggregation. Environmentalists who fight for higher gas mileage re-
101 See Scott Barett, Environmental Regulation for Comparative Advantage, 2 Bus.
STRATEGY REV. 1 (1991).
102 See ADLER, supra note 66, at 85-107 (examining relationships between corporations
and environmental interest groups); see also Todd J. Zywicki, Industry and Environmental
Lobbyists: Enemies or Allies?, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING
THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 60, at 185 (describing
overlapping interests of industry and environmentalists).
103 See Michael S. Greve & James Keller, Funding the Left: The Sources of Financial
Support for 'Public Interest' Law Firms, in CRITICAL LEGAL ISSUES: WORKING PAPER SERIES
(Washington Legal Foundation ed., 1987).
104 See RABKIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 4.
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quirements for cars, therefore, are choosing to kill and maim more
people in accidents. Calling environmental protection a "public
good" does nothing to change the substance of this tragic tradeoff,
and provides no scientific or ethical basis for choosing between these
competing goals.
Every choice is inherently a private one with offsetting tradeoffs
- how much is one willing to surrender in terms of other public and
private goods of society in order to obtain environmental goals. In
other words, the choice is clear - big cars versus little cars; safety
versus environment. When environmentalists choose the pursuit of
environmental goals over all others, they are pursuing their personal
preferences rather than others'. And when they use the political proc-
ess to do it, they are forcing political losers to subsidize their prefer-
ences, because once implemented, everyone is bound by the regula-
tory rule, regardless of whether they favored it or not.
As Jonathan Rauch observes:
[T]hese ["public interest"] groups are just as dedicated to
transferring resources as any other group is. When they
lobby, they want society to divert more resources to some ac-
tivity they like and away from some activity they don't like.
They are out to get something they value, and what they want
will cost someone else time or money, or they wouldn't need
a law to get it .... Environmental groups that advocate pre-
serving spotted owls or old-growth forests value endangered
species and ancient tress more than inexpensive timber, a
preference that some home buyers and logging towns might
not share. 05
This preference to force others to pay more for housing so one can
save the spotted owl simply has nothing to do with the "public inter-
est" or "civic republican" values; it is simply old-fashioned power
politics that those with the most votes can force those with fewer
votes to subsidize their preferences. Rauch offers an especially telling
example of the politics of environmental interest groups:
In Tucson not long ago, an advocacy group called the Ari-
zona Center for Law in the Public Interest announced the fol-
lowing antismog agenda: "We're going to take the position
that the EPA cut off all funding to any capacity-enhancing
roadway project." In its members' minds, this group was a
crusader for the public good. But to people who didn't share
the rather idiosyncratic belief that tying up traffic was a good
105 RAUCH, supra note 70, at 48-49. ,
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way to fight smog, the center was a pressure group pursuing
its agenda at considerable expense to the general public. 06
Talk of "civic republicanism" simply obscures this fundamental
tradeoff - there are winners and losers in politics and the "public in-
terest" has little to do with it. There is no "correct" answer for
whether people should drive big cars or small cars. The decision is a
private one of the tradeoff between safety and environmental protec-
tion, and it is not clear what the deliberative process supposedly adds
to this: "Even in principle, the line between public-spiritedness and
pursuit of private gain is subjective. One person's public-spirited cru-
sader for environmental sanity or entrepreneurial freedom is another
person's job-destroying Luddite or selfish tycoon."'10 7
Wealth transfers to satisfy environmental preferences are largely
regressive transfers. As Joseph P. Kalt has observed, "The caricatures
of environmentalists as well-educated and wealthy, and outdoor rec-
reationalists as Winnebago owners and back-to-the-earth college-aged
offspring of well-to-do families are inaccurate, but not terribly so.', °8
The members of environmental groups tend to have above-average
incomes. For instance, readers of the Sierra Club's magazine Sierra,
have household incomes twice as high as the average American. °9
As economist Terry Anderson observes, "Environmental magazines
are more likely to feature Rolex and BMW than Timex and Volks-
wagen advertisements."'1
10
By contrast, a disproportionate share of the cost of environ-
mental regulation is borne disproportionately by lower-income fami-
lies, and the benefits accrue to upper-income individuals. Demand
for energy usage, for example, tends to be highly income elastic,
meaning that it is very difficult for families in the short run to adjust
their energy consumption."' As a result, when gas prices or electric-
ity prices rise, it is very difficult to reduce consumption, meaning that
energy and fuel bills take a larger chunk out of the family budget. If
an individual has to drive 30 miles to work, he is not likely to sell his
house and move closer to work in response to an increase in gasoline
prices or gas taxes - he will just have to bite the bullet and pay more
for gas. Moreover, poor people tend to drive older cars that get worse
gas mileage, meaning that they use more gasoline per trip. Finally, if
'0 Id. at 49.
107 id.
108 Joseph P. Kalt, The Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation of Coal Strip Mining, 23
NAT. RESOURCES J. 893, 909 (1983); see also WILLIAM TUCKER, PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE:
AMERICA IN THE AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM 48 (1982); William Tucker, Environmentalism:
The Newest Toryism, 14 POL'Y REV. 141 (1980).
109 RAUCH, supra note 70, at 63 (quoting economist Terry L. Anderson).
ee Id. (citations omitted).111 See Kalt, supra note 108, at 908.
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gasoline prices rise too much, a wealthy individual can easily sell his
SUV and buy a more-efficient car; poor people are more constrained
in such choices. Poor people are also more budget constrained from
rapidly switching to alternative fuels, such as solar panels. In short,
increasing the price of energy is regressive, falling on poor people the
hardest. The greater the amount of their budget consumed by energy
bills, the less that is available for food, clothing, shelter, and educa-
tion. Writing in 1983, Kalt estimated that the effect of regulations on
strip mining was to transfer $288.6 million per year to upper-income
land owners, stockholders, and coal miners, while imposing a loss of
$399.1 million per year on individuals on the lower end of the income
scale.1 2 One would expect similar results from initiatives such as the
Kyoto Protocol, which is predicted to result in large increases in en-
ergy prices if ratified. Overall, then, the benefits of environmental
regulation accrue to upper-middle-class environmentalists while poor
people are stuck paying the subsidy.
CONCLUSION
Political environmentalism, then, can probably be most fruitfully
understood as an effort for environmentalists to secure benefits for
themselves, and, through the political process, and to force others to
pay for them. There is thus little obvious difference between envi-
ronmental activists who want more for their projects, and farmers,
defense contractors, or thousands of others who use the political proc-
ess to redistribute money from the public to the goals preferred by
their well-organized and influential interest groups. Surely farmers
believe that the public benefits from subsidized cheese, defense con-
tractors believe the public benefits from more missiles, and lawyers
believe the public benefits from cartelizing the supply of legal ser-
vices. Similarly, environmental activists presumably believe that the
public benefits from ever-greater amounts of environmental protec-
tion -. especially because they can force others to pay for it. The na-
ture of an externality is that if you do not have to pay for the negative
external effects of the activity then you will consume too much of that
activity. This economic principle applies whether the externality is
political, economic, or environmental in nature. Non-political
mechanisms, by contrast, force environmentalists to foot the bill for
their preferences - to compensate landowners for land taken to pro-
112 Id. at 909. It is not clear whether this calculation includes the increased injuries and
deaths that result from underground mining, rather than strip mining. Underground mining is
much more dangerous than is strip mining. Because of the regressive nature of higher energy
prices, this also means that minorities are hit especially hard by higher energy prices. See Bruce
Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 202 (2002).
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tect endangered species, to pay for emission restrictions that damage
economic growth, or to pay full price for recreational amenities that
they prefer. The use of public power for private ends is the essence of
politics; but it also reminds us that there is no fundamental difference
between the Sierra Club on one hand and AARP on the other. More-
over, this recognition also reminds us to be wary of the scientific
claims of environmental groups, who have few incentives to provide
accurate information about the true state of the planet.
It was implied above that the activities of environmental interest
groups could be analogized to those of churches, selling salvation: the
day of the Apocalypse is upon us, and only the worthy will be saved.
Although environmentalism was once a science-based movement, it
has increasingly abandoned its roots in science. As Lomborg docu-
ments, much of the message of environmentalism today has little to
do with scientific truth. Science has become a political tool to
frighten people and to induce political action. In turn, it appears that
what the public seeks is salvation from environmentalism, not sensi-
ble regulatory policy. Like the preacher who excites his congregation
with doomsday messages, environmentalism metes out a similar mes-
sage. Perhaps the "Baptists" metaphor is closer than previously sus-
pected." 1
3
Indeed, environmentalism increasingly has taken on the traits of
an organized religion. 14 Not only has it taken on much of the dogma
and symbolism of a traditional religion, it fills the individual spiritual
void traditionally filled by religion. Indeed, it is increasingly the case
that the core message of environmentalism is not one of humanity's
relationship to the environment, but rather of individual self-sacrifice
and penance. It is simply believed to be inherently wrong and sinful
for individuals to live well and to consume environmental resources -
even if those resources will never run out. Thus, Greenpeace an-
nounces that we are now in a "second oil crisis" - during the first,
there was too little oil, now we have too much."15 For an abundance
of oil will delay the pressure to adopt "clean" fuel technologies and
thereby exacerbate the problem of global warming. Self-denial in the
midst of plenty is the new watchword of environmentalism.
There is a strong sense in which environmentalism now rejects
science and hard-headed policy analysis in favor of mysticism and
moral obligation. It has been said that arguing with someone that re-
cycling is not economically efficient is like arguing that Communion
'- See Melnick, supra note 64, at 80 (calling environmentalism a "formidable secular
religion").
"4 See DEEPAK LAL, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF FACTOR ENDOW-
MENTS, CULTURE, AND POLITICS ON LONG-RUN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1998).
15 See LOMBORG, supra note 5, at 258.
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wafers are not nutritious. Perhaps arguing about the scientific or eco-
nomic evidence regarding environmental issues is to simply miss the
point of modern environmental belief.
If this is the case, then so be it. But it is a strange and disap-
pointing end to a movement that sought to revolutionize the world
through the marriage of science with policy. Rachel Carson argued in
Silent Spring that the only way to avoid catastrophe was to transfer
decision-making authority from elected representatives to scientists.
Today, the scientists have spoken - and the environmental activists
are not listening.

